Hamas has made clear that it will not relinquish control over Gaza’s security forces during any interim phase following the ceasefire, exposing the fragile foundations of postwar reconstruction efforts. Senior Hamas official Mohammed Nazzal confirmed that while the group is open to a temporary truce and a technocratic civil administration, it cannot commit to disarming—a stance that deepens divisions between Hamas, Israel, and the United States over how Gaza will be governed and secured.
Power, Survival, and the Logic Behind Hamas’s Refusal to Disarm
Hamas’s refusal to disarm stems from a combination of political survival instincts, internal cohesion needs, and strategic distrust of international mechanisms. Having ruled Gaza since 2007, the organization views its armed wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, as both a shield against external threats and a guarantor of internal order. For Hamas leaders, giving up arms would mean forfeiting their principal source of leverage and legitimacy.
The devastation of Gaza and the absence of a stable governing structure have strengthened Hamas’s belief that it must remain the principal enforcer of security. Nazzal emphasized that disarmament was a “complex project” requiring clarity on who would take custody of weapons and how enforcement would occur. This ambiguity provides Hamas with maneuvering space to resist external pressure while appearing open to negotiation.
Internally, Hamas faces a fragmented Palestinian political landscape, including rival factions such as Islamic Jihad and elements within Fatah. Without an overarching national consensus, unilateral disarmament could fracture Hamas’s authority or trigger splintering within militant ranks. The group’s leadership fears that surrendering arms would embolden these rivals or invite chaos in the absence of a robust transitional policing force.
Strategically, Hamas’s approach is rooted in its perception that Israel’s long-term goal is not coexistence but containment. Within that framework, arms represent deterrence. For Hamas, maintaining a controlled but active security presence ensures that it remains indispensable to any negotiation about Gaza’s political and territorial future. Disarmament, from its perspective, would make Gaza vulnerable both to external aggression and internal disorder.
A Transitional Gaza: Ceasefire, Reconstruction, and Retained Control
In his interview, Nazzal outlined Hamas’s readiness for a ceasefire lasting up to five years to allow reconstruction in Gaza. Yet, his insistence on retaining security oversight reveals the group’s intention to anchor itself within the postwar political framework. Hamas envisions a transitional phase in which it continues to manage ground-level security while a technocratic administration oversees civil governance.
This dual-power model underscores the group’s determination to separate civil governance from security control—an arrangement designed to preserve its influence while appearing to accommodate international demands. Nazzal suggested that Hamas’s security role would be justified as protection against “thieves and armed gangs,” implying that without its enforcement mechanisms, Gaza could descend into lawlessness.
Such statements also signal Hamas’s attempt to project itself as a stabilizing force rather than a destabilizing militia. However, this approach runs counter to U.S. and Israeli expectations that postwar Gaza should be completely demilitarized. Washington’s plan envisions Hamas transferring power to an internationally supervised committee, while Israel insists that full disarmament is the only acceptable outcome.
Despite this, Hamas continues to assert that it will not obstruct reconstruction efforts and that it seeks long-term calm rather than renewed conflict. The group’s offer of a multi-year ceasefire is framed as a humanitarian necessity, yet its insistence on armed control indicates that it views peace as conditional, not permanent. Nazzal emphasized that Gaza’s recovery must come with “horizons and hope” for Palestinian statehood, positioning the ceasefire as a stepping stone rather than a surrender.
U.S., Israel, and the Disarmament Dilemma
The United States and Israel have both signaled that Hamas’s continued armament is incompatible with their vision for regional security. The U.S.-brokered ceasefire framework requires Hamas to first release all remaining hostages, then commit to full disarmament before governance transitions to a neutral, technocratic council backed by an international body. Israel’s leadership has echoed this position, warning that non-compliance would trigger renewed military action.
However, Hamas’s counter-position highlights the impracticality of enforcing such a framework without a legitimate enforcement mechanism on the ground. The Israeli military campaign left much of Gaza’s infrastructure and governance capacity in ruins, making Hamas’s existing networks the only functioning security apparatus. This reality complicates efforts to impose external supervision or disarmament without creating a security vacuum.
Nazzal’s remarks also reveal Hamas’s distrust of international peacekeeping models. He noted that no concrete discussions had taken place regarding a stabilization force for Gaza, hinting at skepticism toward foreign involvement. This sentiment reflects Hamas’s historical experiences, in which international guarantees—whether through the United Nations or regional mediators—failed to prevent Israeli incursions or uphold ceasefire terms.
The resulting impasse is one of mutual dependency and mutual suspicion: Israel and the U.S. cannot envision stability with Hamas armed, yet they rely on Hamas’s cooperation to maintain temporary order. Meanwhile, Hamas depends on negotiations for reconstruction aid but resists any process that would neutralize its coercive power. This dynamic ensures that disarmament will remain a central obstacle to long-term peace.
Political Future, Elections, and the Quest for Legitimacy
Beyond the military question, Hamas’s political calculus is equally complex. Nazzal confirmed that after the transitional phase, Gaza should move toward elections—a prospect designed to legitimize governance structures and potentially reunify the Palestinian territories under a single framework. Yet, this pathway remains uncertain.
For Hamas, elections represent both an opportunity and a risk. A political process under international supervision might restore some legitimacy, but it could also expose internal divisions or empower rival factions. The group’s insistence on maintaining arms during this period suggests it intends to secure influence over the outcome rather than relinquish it to external or rival Palestinian forces.
Hamas’s broader political narrative continues to center on statehood. Nazzal reiterated that any long-term arrangement must provide Palestinians with “horizons and hope”—a euphemism for tangible movement toward sovereignty. By tying its commitment to peace to progress on statehood, Hamas seeks to reframe its armed presence as a temporary necessity rather than a permanent obstacle.
In practice, however, Israel views these assurances with deep skepticism. To Israeli officials, Hamas’s promise of a five-year truce amounts to a tactical pause aimed at rebuilding its military capacity. This perception makes compromise difficult, as both sides view time not as a bridge to peace but as a means of regrouping.
The enduring stalemate reveals the paradox of Gaza’s future: reconstruction depends on security, but security remains inseparable from Hamas’s armed control. International actors, from Turkey to Qatar, have attempted to mediate, but without a unified Palestinian consensus or credible enforcement mechanism, disarmament remains an illusion.
As Gaza struggles to recover from the devastation of war, the power struggle over who controls its streets—and who decides its fate—continues to define the region’s fragile peace. Hamas’s refusal to disarm is not merely defiance; it is a calculated assertion of survival in a political landscape where force still defines authority.
(Source:www.daily-sun.com)
Power, Survival, and the Logic Behind Hamas’s Refusal to Disarm
Hamas’s refusal to disarm stems from a combination of political survival instincts, internal cohesion needs, and strategic distrust of international mechanisms. Having ruled Gaza since 2007, the organization views its armed wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, as both a shield against external threats and a guarantor of internal order. For Hamas leaders, giving up arms would mean forfeiting their principal source of leverage and legitimacy.
The devastation of Gaza and the absence of a stable governing structure have strengthened Hamas’s belief that it must remain the principal enforcer of security. Nazzal emphasized that disarmament was a “complex project” requiring clarity on who would take custody of weapons and how enforcement would occur. This ambiguity provides Hamas with maneuvering space to resist external pressure while appearing open to negotiation.
Internally, Hamas faces a fragmented Palestinian political landscape, including rival factions such as Islamic Jihad and elements within Fatah. Without an overarching national consensus, unilateral disarmament could fracture Hamas’s authority or trigger splintering within militant ranks. The group’s leadership fears that surrendering arms would embolden these rivals or invite chaos in the absence of a robust transitional policing force.
Strategically, Hamas’s approach is rooted in its perception that Israel’s long-term goal is not coexistence but containment. Within that framework, arms represent deterrence. For Hamas, maintaining a controlled but active security presence ensures that it remains indispensable to any negotiation about Gaza’s political and territorial future. Disarmament, from its perspective, would make Gaza vulnerable both to external aggression and internal disorder.
A Transitional Gaza: Ceasefire, Reconstruction, and Retained Control
In his interview, Nazzal outlined Hamas’s readiness for a ceasefire lasting up to five years to allow reconstruction in Gaza. Yet, his insistence on retaining security oversight reveals the group’s intention to anchor itself within the postwar political framework. Hamas envisions a transitional phase in which it continues to manage ground-level security while a technocratic administration oversees civil governance.
This dual-power model underscores the group’s determination to separate civil governance from security control—an arrangement designed to preserve its influence while appearing to accommodate international demands. Nazzal suggested that Hamas’s security role would be justified as protection against “thieves and armed gangs,” implying that without its enforcement mechanisms, Gaza could descend into lawlessness.
Such statements also signal Hamas’s attempt to project itself as a stabilizing force rather than a destabilizing militia. However, this approach runs counter to U.S. and Israeli expectations that postwar Gaza should be completely demilitarized. Washington’s plan envisions Hamas transferring power to an internationally supervised committee, while Israel insists that full disarmament is the only acceptable outcome.
Despite this, Hamas continues to assert that it will not obstruct reconstruction efforts and that it seeks long-term calm rather than renewed conflict. The group’s offer of a multi-year ceasefire is framed as a humanitarian necessity, yet its insistence on armed control indicates that it views peace as conditional, not permanent. Nazzal emphasized that Gaza’s recovery must come with “horizons and hope” for Palestinian statehood, positioning the ceasefire as a stepping stone rather than a surrender.
U.S., Israel, and the Disarmament Dilemma
The United States and Israel have both signaled that Hamas’s continued armament is incompatible with their vision for regional security. The U.S.-brokered ceasefire framework requires Hamas to first release all remaining hostages, then commit to full disarmament before governance transitions to a neutral, technocratic council backed by an international body. Israel’s leadership has echoed this position, warning that non-compliance would trigger renewed military action.
However, Hamas’s counter-position highlights the impracticality of enforcing such a framework without a legitimate enforcement mechanism on the ground. The Israeli military campaign left much of Gaza’s infrastructure and governance capacity in ruins, making Hamas’s existing networks the only functioning security apparatus. This reality complicates efforts to impose external supervision or disarmament without creating a security vacuum.
Nazzal’s remarks also reveal Hamas’s distrust of international peacekeeping models. He noted that no concrete discussions had taken place regarding a stabilization force for Gaza, hinting at skepticism toward foreign involvement. This sentiment reflects Hamas’s historical experiences, in which international guarantees—whether through the United Nations or regional mediators—failed to prevent Israeli incursions or uphold ceasefire terms.
The resulting impasse is one of mutual dependency and mutual suspicion: Israel and the U.S. cannot envision stability with Hamas armed, yet they rely on Hamas’s cooperation to maintain temporary order. Meanwhile, Hamas depends on negotiations for reconstruction aid but resists any process that would neutralize its coercive power. This dynamic ensures that disarmament will remain a central obstacle to long-term peace.
Political Future, Elections, and the Quest for Legitimacy
Beyond the military question, Hamas’s political calculus is equally complex. Nazzal confirmed that after the transitional phase, Gaza should move toward elections—a prospect designed to legitimize governance structures and potentially reunify the Palestinian territories under a single framework. Yet, this pathway remains uncertain.
For Hamas, elections represent both an opportunity and a risk. A political process under international supervision might restore some legitimacy, but it could also expose internal divisions or empower rival factions. The group’s insistence on maintaining arms during this period suggests it intends to secure influence over the outcome rather than relinquish it to external or rival Palestinian forces.
Hamas’s broader political narrative continues to center on statehood. Nazzal reiterated that any long-term arrangement must provide Palestinians with “horizons and hope”—a euphemism for tangible movement toward sovereignty. By tying its commitment to peace to progress on statehood, Hamas seeks to reframe its armed presence as a temporary necessity rather than a permanent obstacle.
In practice, however, Israel views these assurances with deep skepticism. To Israeli officials, Hamas’s promise of a five-year truce amounts to a tactical pause aimed at rebuilding its military capacity. This perception makes compromise difficult, as both sides view time not as a bridge to peace but as a means of regrouping.
The enduring stalemate reveals the paradox of Gaza’s future: reconstruction depends on security, but security remains inseparable from Hamas’s armed control. International actors, from Turkey to Qatar, have attempted to mediate, but without a unified Palestinian consensus or credible enforcement mechanism, disarmament remains an illusion.
As Gaza struggles to recover from the devastation of war, the power struggle over who controls its streets—and who decides its fate—continues to define the region’s fragile peace. Hamas’s refusal to disarm is not merely defiance; it is a calculated assertion of survival in a political landscape where force still defines authority.
(Source:www.daily-sun.com)