The latest diplomatic signals around the Strait of Hormuz suggest that the most important battle in the prolonged United States-Iran confrontation may no longer be taking place primarily on the military front. It is increasingly centered on who will control the rules governing one of the world's most important maritime chokepoints, how commercial vessels will be allowed to pass, and what security guarantees can prevent another disruption. A United States official has indicated that Washington expects Iran and Oman to reach an agreement soon, with the reopening of commercial shipping potentially becoming a trigger for the next stage of a broader settlement.
At almost exactly the same time, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey have signed a mutual defense agreement under which an armed attack on one of the three would be treated as an attack on all. The timing is significant even though the governments have described the pact as defensive rather than directed against a particular country. The two developments point to the same underlying reality: regional states increasingly want greater control over their own security while the United States seeks a practical exit from a conflict that has disrupted energy supplies and exposed the limits of military pressure alone.
Hormuz Has Become the Core Bargaining Chip
The importance of the Strait of Hormuz explains why negotiations over its reopening have become central to the wider conflict. Before the current crisis, roughly 20.9 million barrels per day of oil and petroleum liquids moved through the strait during the first half of 2025, equivalent to about one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption. The waterway also carries a substantial share of global liquefied natural gas shipments, particularly supplies originating in the Gulf.
That dependence gives Iran considerable leverage even when its own economy is suffering from the disruption. Tehran can use access to the waterway as a negotiating instrument because reopening shipping does not merely benefit Gulf exporters and Asian consumers; it also provides Iran with a route to restore its own oil exports and reduce the pressure created by the United States blockade of its ports. Recent reporting indicates that Iranian oil exports have fallen sharply under the blockade, increasing the economic incentive for Tehran to secure a workable shipping arrangement.
The difficulty is that reopening Hormuz is not simply a question of allowing ships to sail again. Iran and Oman have been discussing the future administration of navigation, maritime services and associated costs, while competing proposals have emerged over how the route should be managed. Oman's approach has reportedly favored a regional management system and voluntary transit fees, whereas Iran has sought a greater role in controlling traffic through the waterway.
This difference is crucial because Washington needs more than a temporary reduction in attacks. It needs evidence that commercial vessels can move without arbitrary restrictions, military threats or a system that effectively gives Tehran unilateral control over international shipping. The United States official's statement that the blockade of Iranian ports would be lifted only after commercial shipping is restored without impediments therefore indicates that Washington is treating implementation, rather than diplomatic promises alone, as the decisive test.
Why Oman Has Become Indispensable
Oman's role is central because of its geography and its long-standing ability to communicate with both Iran and Western governments. The country shares the Strait of Hormuz with Iran and has already been involved in discussions over navigation arrangements and maritime security. Earlier talks produced a commitment by the two countries to continue consultations on safe passage and the future administration of navigation.
That gives Muscat an unusually valuable diplomatic position. It can discuss Iranian sovereignty concerns without being perceived in Tehran in the same way as Washington, while also maintaining relationships with the United States and other Gulf states that depend heavily on unrestricted shipping. The challenge is that Oman cannot by itself guarantee that every Iranian military or political actor will accept a negotiated arrangement. Any agreement therefore has to survive the competing interests of Iran's civilian government, security institutions and military establishment.
The repeated movement toward an agreement followed by renewed uncertainty illustrates this problem. Reports in recent days have suggested progress on the geographic coordinates of a shipping route and preparations for a joint announcement, but Iranian officials have also stressed that an agreement between Iran and Oman alone would not necessarily guarantee security in the waterway. That distinction matters because technical agreement on a route is easier to achieve than political agreement on who has authority to enforce it.
A Regional Defense Pact Takes Shape
The Saudi Arabia-Pakistan-Turkey agreement adds another dimension to the emerging security equation. The three countries have different strategic priorities, but all have strong reasons to improve their ability to deter attacks without relying exclusively on an outside power. Saudi Arabia is directly exposed to missile and drone threats, Pakistan has long-standing security ties with Saudi Arabia, and Turkey possesses significant military capabilities and a major defense industry. The agreement therefore combines different forms of strategic weight rather than representing a simple military bloc.
Its significance also lies in the principle of collective deterrence. A threat directed at Saudi Arabia could now potentially create consequences involving Pakistan and Turkey, while an attack on either of the other members could trigger political and military consultations involving Riyadh. The precise practical obligations will depend on how the agreement is implemented, but even the commitment itself is intended to raise the potential cost of aggression against any member.
The pact should not, however, be reduced to a purely sectarian alliance. All three countries have majority Sunni Muslim populations, but their strategic relationships with Iran, the United States, Russia, China, Israel and other regional powers differ considerably. Turkey has emphasized that the agreement is defensive, while Saudi Arabia has an immediate interest in protecting its territory and economic infrastructure. Pakistan, meanwhile, has reasons to strengthen its relationship with Gulf partners while avoiding unnecessary escalation with Iran.
The agreement is therefore better understood as part of a wider regional search for strategic insurance. The current conflict has demonstrated how quickly attacks involving Iran and its regional partners can affect countries far beyond the immediate battlefield. Attacks on commercial shipping have already imposed direct human and economic costs, with Abu Dhabi National Oil Company reporting that 15 of its vessels had been targeted since the conflict began, causing one death and 20 injuries among crew members.
Washington Faces a Narrow Diplomatic Window
For the United States, the emerging picture creates both an opportunity and a complication. A successful Iran-Oman arrangement could provide a mechanism for restoring oil traffic, easing pressure on energy markets and creating conditions for a broader political settlement. But Washington cannot afford to accept an arrangement that merely replaces open conflict with an unstable system in which Iran retains the ability to determine which vessels can pass.
That is why the language surrounding the proposed agreement is important. The United States is linking sanctions and the blockade to measurable Iranian actions, while Iran is attempting to convert its control over access to Hormuz into negotiating leverage. The two sides therefore have overlapping but competing incentives: Washington wants predictable commercial navigation, while Tehran wants security arrangements that recognize its regional influence and reduce the economic pressure imposed on it.
The new defense pact among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey could strengthen the pressure for such a settlement while simultaneously making the regional environment more complicated. A stronger collective deterrent may discourage further attacks against Gulf states, but it could also make any future confrontation involving one member more consequential. For that reason, the success of the Hormuz negotiations may depend not only on whether ships can physically return to the waterway, but on whether the agreement establishes rules that regional powers regard as legitimate and sustainable.
The immediate diplomatic objective is therefore deceptively simple: reopen the strait. The harder task is creating a security arrangement in which Iran accepts predictable commercial passage, Oman can serve as a credible intermediary, Gulf states can protect their economic interests, and Washington can reduce its military involvement without appearing to surrender control of the broader regional balance. The simultaneous movement toward an Iran-Oman shipping agreement and a new regional defense partnership shows that the next phase of the crisis is likely to be shaped as much by competing security architectures as by battlefield developments.
(Source:www.reuters.com)
At almost exactly the same time, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey have signed a mutual defense agreement under which an armed attack on one of the three would be treated as an attack on all. The timing is significant even though the governments have described the pact as defensive rather than directed against a particular country. The two developments point to the same underlying reality: regional states increasingly want greater control over their own security while the United States seeks a practical exit from a conflict that has disrupted energy supplies and exposed the limits of military pressure alone.
Hormuz Has Become the Core Bargaining Chip
The importance of the Strait of Hormuz explains why negotiations over its reopening have become central to the wider conflict. Before the current crisis, roughly 20.9 million barrels per day of oil and petroleum liquids moved through the strait during the first half of 2025, equivalent to about one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption. The waterway also carries a substantial share of global liquefied natural gas shipments, particularly supplies originating in the Gulf.
That dependence gives Iran considerable leverage even when its own economy is suffering from the disruption. Tehran can use access to the waterway as a negotiating instrument because reopening shipping does not merely benefit Gulf exporters and Asian consumers; it also provides Iran with a route to restore its own oil exports and reduce the pressure created by the United States blockade of its ports. Recent reporting indicates that Iranian oil exports have fallen sharply under the blockade, increasing the economic incentive for Tehran to secure a workable shipping arrangement.
The difficulty is that reopening Hormuz is not simply a question of allowing ships to sail again. Iran and Oman have been discussing the future administration of navigation, maritime services and associated costs, while competing proposals have emerged over how the route should be managed. Oman's approach has reportedly favored a regional management system and voluntary transit fees, whereas Iran has sought a greater role in controlling traffic through the waterway.
This difference is crucial because Washington needs more than a temporary reduction in attacks. It needs evidence that commercial vessels can move without arbitrary restrictions, military threats or a system that effectively gives Tehran unilateral control over international shipping. The United States official's statement that the blockade of Iranian ports would be lifted only after commercial shipping is restored without impediments therefore indicates that Washington is treating implementation, rather than diplomatic promises alone, as the decisive test.
Why Oman Has Become Indispensable
Oman's role is central because of its geography and its long-standing ability to communicate with both Iran and Western governments. The country shares the Strait of Hormuz with Iran and has already been involved in discussions over navigation arrangements and maritime security. Earlier talks produced a commitment by the two countries to continue consultations on safe passage and the future administration of navigation.
That gives Muscat an unusually valuable diplomatic position. It can discuss Iranian sovereignty concerns without being perceived in Tehran in the same way as Washington, while also maintaining relationships with the United States and other Gulf states that depend heavily on unrestricted shipping. The challenge is that Oman cannot by itself guarantee that every Iranian military or political actor will accept a negotiated arrangement. Any agreement therefore has to survive the competing interests of Iran's civilian government, security institutions and military establishment.
The repeated movement toward an agreement followed by renewed uncertainty illustrates this problem. Reports in recent days have suggested progress on the geographic coordinates of a shipping route and preparations for a joint announcement, but Iranian officials have also stressed that an agreement between Iran and Oman alone would not necessarily guarantee security in the waterway. That distinction matters because technical agreement on a route is easier to achieve than political agreement on who has authority to enforce it.
A Regional Defense Pact Takes Shape
The Saudi Arabia-Pakistan-Turkey agreement adds another dimension to the emerging security equation. The three countries have different strategic priorities, but all have strong reasons to improve their ability to deter attacks without relying exclusively on an outside power. Saudi Arabia is directly exposed to missile and drone threats, Pakistan has long-standing security ties with Saudi Arabia, and Turkey possesses significant military capabilities and a major defense industry. The agreement therefore combines different forms of strategic weight rather than representing a simple military bloc.
Its significance also lies in the principle of collective deterrence. A threat directed at Saudi Arabia could now potentially create consequences involving Pakistan and Turkey, while an attack on either of the other members could trigger political and military consultations involving Riyadh. The precise practical obligations will depend on how the agreement is implemented, but even the commitment itself is intended to raise the potential cost of aggression against any member.
The pact should not, however, be reduced to a purely sectarian alliance. All three countries have majority Sunni Muslim populations, but their strategic relationships with Iran, the United States, Russia, China, Israel and other regional powers differ considerably. Turkey has emphasized that the agreement is defensive, while Saudi Arabia has an immediate interest in protecting its territory and economic infrastructure. Pakistan, meanwhile, has reasons to strengthen its relationship with Gulf partners while avoiding unnecessary escalation with Iran.
The agreement is therefore better understood as part of a wider regional search for strategic insurance. The current conflict has demonstrated how quickly attacks involving Iran and its regional partners can affect countries far beyond the immediate battlefield. Attacks on commercial shipping have already imposed direct human and economic costs, with Abu Dhabi National Oil Company reporting that 15 of its vessels had been targeted since the conflict began, causing one death and 20 injuries among crew members.
Washington Faces a Narrow Diplomatic Window
For the United States, the emerging picture creates both an opportunity and a complication. A successful Iran-Oman arrangement could provide a mechanism for restoring oil traffic, easing pressure on energy markets and creating conditions for a broader political settlement. But Washington cannot afford to accept an arrangement that merely replaces open conflict with an unstable system in which Iran retains the ability to determine which vessels can pass.
That is why the language surrounding the proposed agreement is important. The United States is linking sanctions and the blockade to measurable Iranian actions, while Iran is attempting to convert its control over access to Hormuz into negotiating leverage. The two sides therefore have overlapping but competing incentives: Washington wants predictable commercial navigation, while Tehran wants security arrangements that recognize its regional influence and reduce the economic pressure imposed on it.
The new defense pact among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey could strengthen the pressure for such a settlement while simultaneously making the regional environment more complicated. A stronger collective deterrent may discourage further attacks against Gulf states, but it could also make any future confrontation involving one member more consequential. For that reason, the success of the Hormuz negotiations may depend not only on whether ships can physically return to the waterway, but on whether the agreement establishes rules that regional powers regard as legitimate and sustainable.
The immediate diplomatic objective is therefore deceptively simple: reopen the strait. The harder task is creating a security arrangement in which Iran accepts predictable commercial passage, Oman can serve as a credible intermediary, Gulf states can protect their economic interests, and Washington can reduce its military involvement without appearing to surrender control of the broader regional balance. The simultaneous movement toward an Iran-Oman shipping agreement and a new regional defense partnership shows that the next phase of the crisis is likely to be shaped as much by competing security architectures as by battlefield developments.
(Source:www.reuters.com)