Amnesty International has identified Pakistan’s intelligence institutions as the principal operators of a sweeping surveillance system that monitors millions of citizens. At the center of this framework is the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), working alongside the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), the Intelligence Bureau (IB), and the National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICC). These bodies coordinate surveillance operations that extend into every level of mobile and internet communications.
The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) has also played a crucial role by mandating that mobile operators integrate their systems with government interception hubs. Court disclosures in Islamabad revealed that telecom providers were required to install surveillance equipment under PTA orders, confirming that directives for such practices originate at the highest levels of the security establishment. Even as ministries publicly deny involvement, operational evidence ties the infrastructure directly to state agencies.
Purpose of the Spying Activities
The state has repeatedly justified surveillance as a tool for ensuring national security. Pakistan faces persistent internal threats, from extremist groups to separatist insurgencies in Balochistan and tribal areas. Officials argue that mass monitoring is necessary to identify hostile actors and intercept communications before attacks occur.
Amnesty, however, points to a broader purpose. The rollout of surveillance systems coincided with political turmoil following the 2022 split between the military and former prime minister Imran Khan. Thousands of activists linked to Khan’s party were detained, and leaked private calls involving political figures were circulated. The organization argues that surveillance in Pakistan is as much about controlling political opposition and restricting criticism as it is about security.
Two major technologies anchor Pakistan’s monitoring regime: the Lawful Intercept Management System (LIMS) and the Web Monitoring System (WMS 2.0). LIMS provides agencies with direct access to calls, texts, and user metadata across mobile networks. With a capacity to intercept at least four million phones simultaneously, it functions as a nationwide interception system installed directly into telecom infrastructure.
WMS 2.0 operates as a large-scale internet firewall capable of managing two million sessions at a time. It enables the state to throttle, block, or filter websites and social media platforms, targeting both mainstream sites and circumvention tools like VPNs. Amnesty reports that together, the two systems create a synchronized system of surveillance: one capturing communications at the device level, the other policing access to information on the web.
Basis of Amnesty’s Allegations
Amnesty’s claims are supported by documentary and technical evidence. The 2024 Islamabad High Court case filed by Bushra Bibi, the wife of former prime minister Khan, revealed that the telecom regulator had ordered companies to install LIMS. While defense ministries denied possessing such capacity, court testimony exposed the operational reality.
The organization also reviewed leaked technical files, licensing agreements, and international trade data to establish the origins of the surveillance equipment. Supply chains link the firewall to Chinese firms such as Geedge Networks, alongside hardware from U.S. and French companies. The interception system was sourced from a German manufacturer and deployed through UAE-based monitoring centers. Amnesty’s report outlines these findings as the factual basis for its assessment that mass surveillance is occurring.
The surveillance network is designed to function in tandem. LIMS provides real-time interception of phone-based communications, while WMS 2.0 ensures that online content can be filtered or restricted. Together, they create a multi-layered control system where individuals’ conversations can be tracked while their access to platforms for dissent is simultaneously curtailed.
Such integration is particularly significant in Pakistan’s volatile provinces. In Balochistan, internet shutdowns and website restrictions have isolated communities for years. Combined with allegations of enforced disappearances and curbs on political activism, the surveillance grid becomes a mechanism of both information control and physical repression. Amnesty highlights this dual function as evidence that the system’s purpose is broader than counterterrorism.
Impact on Society and Political Freedoms
The scale of surveillance has produced what Amnesty describes as a “chilling effect.” Knowing that millions of phones can be tapped, citizens increasingly self-censor their conversations. Journalists report difficulties in maintaining contact with sources, fearing interception. Activists avoid digital organizing, concerned about tracking.
The effects are felt most strongly in politically sensitive areas. Social media blackouts and internet restrictions during protests or unrest have become common. Civil rights advocates argue that the ability to shut down platforms or monitor conversations has drastically narrowed the space for free expression. Amnesty stresses that while monitoring centers are common worldwide, Pakistan’s combination of phone tapping and large-scale internet filtering is unusual and far-reaching outside China.
Pakistan’s legal framework requires judicial warrants for surveillance under the Fair Trial Act, but in practice these safeguards are routinely bypassed. The Islamabad High Court has acknowledged that surveillance without judicial authorization is unlawful, yet enforcement of this principle remains weak.
Telecom companies, compelled by PTA directives, face little choice but to comply. The lack of transparency around orders, combined with limited oversight from parliament or the judiciary, has created a regulatory vacuum. This allows agencies to expand surveillance capabilities without accountability, leaving citizens with no meaningful avenue to challenge violations of privacy.
The equipment behind Pakistan’s surveillance infrastructure is drawn from multiple international sources. LIMS was developed by a German firm and deployed through UAE-based monitoring centers, while WMS 2.0 relies on Chinese suppliers as well as hardware and software from U.S. and French companies. An earlier version used Canadian technology.
Export controls are frequently cited by companies as evidence that they comply with international law, but Amnesty notes that enforcement mechanisms are weak. Firms often disclaim knowledge of how their products are used after delivery, leaving governments free to adapt them for domestic purposes. This global supply chain has enabled Pakistan to build one of the world’s most comprehensive surveillance regimes with minimal resistance.
(Source:www.business-standard.com)
The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) has also played a crucial role by mandating that mobile operators integrate their systems with government interception hubs. Court disclosures in Islamabad revealed that telecom providers were required to install surveillance equipment under PTA orders, confirming that directives for such practices originate at the highest levels of the security establishment. Even as ministries publicly deny involvement, operational evidence ties the infrastructure directly to state agencies.
Purpose of the Spying Activities
The state has repeatedly justified surveillance as a tool for ensuring national security. Pakistan faces persistent internal threats, from extremist groups to separatist insurgencies in Balochistan and tribal areas. Officials argue that mass monitoring is necessary to identify hostile actors and intercept communications before attacks occur.
Amnesty, however, points to a broader purpose. The rollout of surveillance systems coincided with political turmoil following the 2022 split between the military and former prime minister Imran Khan. Thousands of activists linked to Khan’s party were detained, and leaked private calls involving political figures were circulated. The organization argues that surveillance in Pakistan is as much about controlling political opposition and restricting criticism as it is about security.
Two major technologies anchor Pakistan’s monitoring regime: the Lawful Intercept Management System (LIMS) and the Web Monitoring System (WMS 2.0). LIMS provides agencies with direct access to calls, texts, and user metadata across mobile networks. With a capacity to intercept at least four million phones simultaneously, it functions as a nationwide interception system installed directly into telecom infrastructure.
WMS 2.0 operates as a large-scale internet firewall capable of managing two million sessions at a time. It enables the state to throttle, block, or filter websites and social media platforms, targeting both mainstream sites and circumvention tools like VPNs. Amnesty reports that together, the two systems create a synchronized system of surveillance: one capturing communications at the device level, the other policing access to information on the web.
Basis of Amnesty’s Allegations
Amnesty’s claims are supported by documentary and technical evidence. The 2024 Islamabad High Court case filed by Bushra Bibi, the wife of former prime minister Khan, revealed that the telecom regulator had ordered companies to install LIMS. While defense ministries denied possessing such capacity, court testimony exposed the operational reality.
The organization also reviewed leaked technical files, licensing agreements, and international trade data to establish the origins of the surveillance equipment. Supply chains link the firewall to Chinese firms such as Geedge Networks, alongside hardware from U.S. and French companies. The interception system was sourced from a German manufacturer and deployed through UAE-based monitoring centers. Amnesty’s report outlines these findings as the factual basis for its assessment that mass surveillance is occurring.
The surveillance network is designed to function in tandem. LIMS provides real-time interception of phone-based communications, while WMS 2.0 ensures that online content can be filtered or restricted. Together, they create a multi-layered control system where individuals’ conversations can be tracked while their access to platforms for dissent is simultaneously curtailed.
Such integration is particularly significant in Pakistan’s volatile provinces. In Balochistan, internet shutdowns and website restrictions have isolated communities for years. Combined with allegations of enforced disappearances and curbs on political activism, the surveillance grid becomes a mechanism of both information control and physical repression. Amnesty highlights this dual function as evidence that the system’s purpose is broader than counterterrorism.
Impact on Society and Political Freedoms
The scale of surveillance has produced what Amnesty describes as a “chilling effect.” Knowing that millions of phones can be tapped, citizens increasingly self-censor their conversations. Journalists report difficulties in maintaining contact with sources, fearing interception. Activists avoid digital organizing, concerned about tracking.
The effects are felt most strongly in politically sensitive areas. Social media blackouts and internet restrictions during protests or unrest have become common. Civil rights advocates argue that the ability to shut down platforms or monitor conversations has drastically narrowed the space for free expression. Amnesty stresses that while monitoring centers are common worldwide, Pakistan’s combination of phone tapping and large-scale internet filtering is unusual and far-reaching outside China.
Pakistan’s legal framework requires judicial warrants for surveillance under the Fair Trial Act, but in practice these safeguards are routinely bypassed. The Islamabad High Court has acknowledged that surveillance without judicial authorization is unlawful, yet enforcement of this principle remains weak.
Telecom companies, compelled by PTA directives, face little choice but to comply. The lack of transparency around orders, combined with limited oversight from parliament or the judiciary, has created a regulatory vacuum. This allows agencies to expand surveillance capabilities without accountability, leaving citizens with no meaningful avenue to challenge violations of privacy.
The equipment behind Pakistan’s surveillance infrastructure is drawn from multiple international sources. LIMS was developed by a German firm and deployed through UAE-based monitoring centers, while WMS 2.0 relies on Chinese suppliers as well as hardware and software from U.S. and French companies. An earlier version used Canadian technology.
Export controls are frequently cited by companies as evidence that they comply with international law, but Amnesty notes that enforcement mechanisms are weak. Firms often disclaim knowledge of how their products are used after delivery, leaving governments free to adapt them for domestic purposes. This global supply chain has enabled Pakistan to build one of the world’s most comprehensive surveillance regimes with minimal resistance.
(Source:www.business-standard.com)