President Vladimir Putin’s trip to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit is being used by Moscow as a targeted push to arrest a slide in bilateral commerce and to convert high-level diplomatic warmth into tangible economic commitments. Russian officials have signalled that the visit is focused less on symbolism than on practical agreements that can expand energy supplies, broaden agricultural exports and secure critical industrial and technological inputs from China — moves Moscow sees as essential to sustaining its economy under prolonged Western sanctions.
Russian leaders view the meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping as a window to revive trade flows that rocketed after 2022 but have softened this year. Bilateral trade surged to an unprecedented level in 2024 as Beijing absorbed large volumes of Russian energy and goods while supplying everything from consumer electronics to cars. Yet official customs figures show turnover falling in 2025, prompting Moscow to press Beijing for deals that will reverse the trend and shore up export revenues and import channels.
Moscow’s immediate priorities are clear: stabilise hydrocarbon sales, accelerate large-scale pipeline and LNG projects, and open new agricultural corridors — all with an eye to guaranteeing hard-currency inflows and longer-term market access. Officials and industry executives travelling with the president hope concrete memoranda and commercial agreements announced during or shortly after the Tianjin summit will translate into measurable trade increases in the coming quarters.
Energy links: locking in long-term flows and new projects
Russia is pursuing several energy-focused objectives with urgency. First among them is getting the stalled Power of Siberia-2 pipeline back onto a final contract path: if built, the roughly 2,600 km pipeline would carry up to 50 billion cubic metres of gas a year to China and create a multi-decade revenue stream for Russian producers. Moscow is also pressing to broaden gas and oil sales terms, explore additional pipeline and LNG arrangements, and secure long-term price formulas that reduce exposure to short-term volatility. Officials argue that binding infrastructure deals would not only reverse recent declines in fuel shipments but also deepen interdependence that favours Russian export planning.
The energy agenda Is politically charged: Russian leaders treat guaranteed Chinese demand as essential insurance against the loss of Western markets. While Beijing has shown appetite for Russian hydrocarbons, discussions linger over volumes, delivery timelines and pricing. Moscow is trying to convert rhetorical support into binding contracts that can be implemented quickly and visibly — a task complicated by China’s own medium-term energy forecasts and by Moscow’s insistence on favourable contractual terms.
Agriculture and food exports: diversifying Russia’s sales to China
Moscow is also pressing to expand agricultural exports to China, spotlighting wheat and other staples as a potential growth area. Russian officials have been seeking to open steady channels for winter wheat and other commodities, arguing that Beijing’s large and growing food market could absorb surpluses and provide stable export earnings. Agriculture is attractive because shipments are less technology-intensive and can be ramped up relatively quickly, but previous efforts have been slowed by regulatory, sanitary and logistical hurdles that Moscow now hopes to clear through intergovernmental agreements.
Beyond raw commodity sales, officials envisage more complex agricultural cooperation — joint food-processing ventures, logistics and storage projects, and cross-border investment in supply chains. Such initiatives would both raise the value of exports and generate employment and industrial activity inside Russia, a political selling point for the Kremlin as it seeks to show domestic economic dividends from closer ties with Beijing.
A critical, more sensitive aim for Moscow is to secure continued access to Chinese industrial goods and components that have become essential to Russian manufacturing and defence production. Beijing supplies a wide range of technology and intermediate goods — from industrial machine tools to electronics — that Russian firms currently use to maintain output. Kremlin advisers frame targeted industrial deals as necessary to keep factories running and to accelerate import-substitution programs where possible.
Yet Russia’s strategy is twofold: preserve the imports that cannot yet be domestically replaced while using state support to expand local production of machine tools and other capital goods. Moscow highlights recent gains in domestic machine-tool output as proof that carefully managed industrial policy, paired with selective Chinese sourcing, can reduce vulnerabilities without fully surrendering key sectors to foreign suppliers. The aim in Tianjin is therefore pragmatic — secure supplies and technology transfers that meet immediate needs while protecting room for Russian industrial recovery plans.
Addressing sectoral slumps and market saturation
The urgency of the Kremlin’s push is underscored by recent sectoral data. After a wartime realignment of trade that pushed volumes to new highs, some segments have corrected sharply: Chinese vehicle imports into Russia plunged, and energy shipments have softened compared with 2024 peaks. The Kremlin sees that slump as partly cyclical but also as a symptom of market saturation in certain consumer categories and of short-term commercial planning that favoured immediate fills of demand rather than coordinated industrial development. Moscow’s negotiating team is therefore seeking agreements that will rebalance trade composition toward higher-value items and long-term projects.
Putin’s presence at the SCO summit, alongside more than 20 world leaders, gives Moscow a diplomatic stage to press these trade objectives. The Kremlin intends to use the Tianjin meetings both to headline bilateral cooperation and to clinch technical and commercial accords that can be publicised at home as policy wins. Officials expect any energy and agriculture deals, together with practical trade facilitation measures, to be promoted as evidence that Russia can sustain and deepen ties with its largest trading partner despite external pressures.
But Russian officials also approach the talks with the sober awareness that China, with an economy many multiples larger than Russia’s, will prioritize its own strategic and economic interests. Moscow’s task in Tianjin is therefore to convert the diplomatic goodwill of summitry into contracts and project timetables that materially lift trade flows — a complex negotiation that will test the balance between political partnership and transactional national interest.
As Putin returns from Tianjin, Moscow will judge the visit’s success less by the warm photos and speeches than by the signature pages and delivery timetables. For the Kremlin, reversing the 2025 trade slowdown requires both headline energy accords and a suite of practical, implementable measures that can be monitored in months, not just years. Whether Tianjin yields that combination will shape Moscow’s economic outlook through the next budgetary cycle.
(Source:www.japantimes.co.jp)
Russian leaders view the meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping as a window to revive trade flows that rocketed after 2022 but have softened this year. Bilateral trade surged to an unprecedented level in 2024 as Beijing absorbed large volumes of Russian energy and goods while supplying everything from consumer electronics to cars. Yet official customs figures show turnover falling in 2025, prompting Moscow to press Beijing for deals that will reverse the trend and shore up export revenues and import channels.
Moscow’s immediate priorities are clear: stabilise hydrocarbon sales, accelerate large-scale pipeline and LNG projects, and open new agricultural corridors — all with an eye to guaranteeing hard-currency inflows and longer-term market access. Officials and industry executives travelling with the president hope concrete memoranda and commercial agreements announced during or shortly after the Tianjin summit will translate into measurable trade increases in the coming quarters.
Energy links: locking in long-term flows and new projects
Russia is pursuing several energy-focused objectives with urgency. First among them is getting the stalled Power of Siberia-2 pipeline back onto a final contract path: if built, the roughly 2,600 km pipeline would carry up to 50 billion cubic metres of gas a year to China and create a multi-decade revenue stream for Russian producers. Moscow is also pressing to broaden gas and oil sales terms, explore additional pipeline and LNG arrangements, and secure long-term price formulas that reduce exposure to short-term volatility. Officials argue that binding infrastructure deals would not only reverse recent declines in fuel shipments but also deepen interdependence that favours Russian export planning.
The energy agenda Is politically charged: Russian leaders treat guaranteed Chinese demand as essential insurance against the loss of Western markets. While Beijing has shown appetite for Russian hydrocarbons, discussions linger over volumes, delivery timelines and pricing. Moscow is trying to convert rhetorical support into binding contracts that can be implemented quickly and visibly — a task complicated by China’s own medium-term energy forecasts and by Moscow’s insistence on favourable contractual terms.
Agriculture and food exports: diversifying Russia’s sales to China
Moscow is also pressing to expand agricultural exports to China, spotlighting wheat and other staples as a potential growth area. Russian officials have been seeking to open steady channels for winter wheat and other commodities, arguing that Beijing’s large and growing food market could absorb surpluses and provide stable export earnings. Agriculture is attractive because shipments are less technology-intensive and can be ramped up relatively quickly, but previous efforts have been slowed by regulatory, sanitary and logistical hurdles that Moscow now hopes to clear through intergovernmental agreements.
Beyond raw commodity sales, officials envisage more complex agricultural cooperation — joint food-processing ventures, logistics and storage projects, and cross-border investment in supply chains. Such initiatives would both raise the value of exports and generate employment and industrial activity inside Russia, a political selling point for the Kremlin as it seeks to show domestic economic dividends from closer ties with Beijing.
A critical, more sensitive aim for Moscow is to secure continued access to Chinese industrial goods and components that have become essential to Russian manufacturing and defence production. Beijing supplies a wide range of technology and intermediate goods — from industrial machine tools to electronics — that Russian firms currently use to maintain output. Kremlin advisers frame targeted industrial deals as necessary to keep factories running and to accelerate import-substitution programs where possible.
Yet Russia’s strategy is twofold: preserve the imports that cannot yet be domestically replaced while using state support to expand local production of machine tools and other capital goods. Moscow highlights recent gains in domestic machine-tool output as proof that carefully managed industrial policy, paired with selective Chinese sourcing, can reduce vulnerabilities without fully surrendering key sectors to foreign suppliers. The aim in Tianjin is therefore pragmatic — secure supplies and technology transfers that meet immediate needs while protecting room for Russian industrial recovery plans.
Addressing sectoral slumps and market saturation
The urgency of the Kremlin’s push is underscored by recent sectoral data. After a wartime realignment of trade that pushed volumes to new highs, some segments have corrected sharply: Chinese vehicle imports into Russia plunged, and energy shipments have softened compared with 2024 peaks. The Kremlin sees that slump as partly cyclical but also as a symptom of market saturation in certain consumer categories and of short-term commercial planning that favoured immediate fills of demand rather than coordinated industrial development. Moscow’s negotiating team is therefore seeking agreements that will rebalance trade composition toward higher-value items and long-term projects.
Putin’s presence at the SCO summit, alongside more than 20 world leaders, gives Moscow a diplomatic stage to press these trade objectives. The Kremlin intends to use the Tianjin meetings both to headline bilateral cooperation and to clinch technical and commercial accords that can be publicised at home as policy wins. Officials expect any energy and agriculture deals, together with practical trade facilitation measures, to be promoted as evidence that Russia can sustain and deepen ties with its largest trading partner despite external pressures.
But Russian officials also approach the talks with the sober awareness that China, with an economy many multiples larger than Russia’s, will prioritize its own strategic and economic interests. Moscow’s task in Tianjin is therefore to convert the diplomatic goodwill of summitry into contracts and project timetables that materially lift trade flows — a complex negotiation that will test the balance between political partnership and transactional national interest.
As Putin returns from Tianjin, Moscow will judge the visit’s success less by the warm photos and speeches than by the signature pages and delivery timetables. For the Kremlin, reversing the 2025 trade slowdown requires both headline energy accords and a suite of practical, implementable measures that can be monitored in months, not just years. Whether Tianjin yields that combination will shape Moscow’s economic outlook through the next budgetary cycle.
(Source:www.japantimes.co.jp)