Brussels has quietly instructed Europe’s leading corporations to disclose detailed information on their planned and ongoing investments in the United States, a move timed to coincide with an accelerated push to finalize complex trade negotiations with Washington. This unprecedented request, conveyed directly from the European Commission to industry associations and high-profile CEOs, underlines a growing desire in Brussels to fortify its bargaining power by showcasing the depth of European economic engagement across the Atlantic. EU leaders believe that by mapping corporate commitments to American factories, research hubs, and regional development, they can navigate President Trump’s protectionist impulses and forestall further tariff escalation on European exports.
In recent weeks, officials in Brussels have circulated surveys through the Confederation of European Business and the European Roundtable for Industry, two umbrella groups representing hundreds of companies from industries such as automotive, aerospace, pharmaceuticals, and digital services. The Commission’s outreach came with an urgent caveat: companies should treat the inquiry as high-priority and respond with comprehensive data on capital expenditures, job creation plans, and planned facility expansions in the U.S. over the next three to five years. While Brussels has periodically consulted industry stakeholders ahead of major trade initiatives, demanding granular U.S. investment figures represents a notable intensification of its data-driven strategy—one aimed at countering Washington’s “America First” narrative by highlighting the tangible benefits that European corporations already contribute to the American economy.
At the heart of Brussels’ approach lies a pragmatic calculation: if European negotiators can demonstrate that EU firms are pivotal to U.S. manufacturing, technology innovation, and job growth, President Trump and his advisors may be more inclined to temper threats of higher tariffs on sectors such as steel, automobiles, and chemicals. In multiple closed-door sessions, Commission trade specialists have emphasized that current talks will hinge less on abstract academic arguments about free trade theory and more on hard numbers that underscore reciprocal economic ties. For example, if Brussels can show that a major German automaker’s planned $3 billion battery plant in the Midwest supports thousands of workers, that fact becomes leverage when U.S. negotiators contemplate extending a 25 percent tariff on imported European cars. Conversely, highlighting that a Swiss pharmaceutical company’s multibillion-dollar R\&D campus in New Jersey catalyzes local supply chains could dissuade the White House from stoking further friction over intellectual property protection.
The request also reflects broader anxiety within EU capitals that Europe has more at stake in transatlantic commerce than the United States. According to data compiled last year, EU firms collectively invested over $150 billion in the American economy, spanning sectors from aerospace to agribusiness. In contrast, U.S. capital flows into Europe hovered around $100 billion—meaning that, on a net basis, European corporate spending has outpaced American outlays since 2023. Commissioners believe that emphasizing this asymmetry could mitigate Washington’s inclination to treat Europe as a hostile trading partner rather than a strategic ally. “We need to show that our investments sustain jobs, innovation clusters, and infrastructure in vital swing states,” commented a senior EU trade official. “The United States can ill afford a broad-based economic decoupling; our companies are already helping to power their growth.”
Brussels framed its inquiry to coincide with growing uncertainty in the run-up to formal trade dialogue sessions planned between EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič and his American counterparts. After months of back-and-forth over steel and aluminium duties—where permanent 25 percent U.S. tariffs have clashed with retaliatory EU levies on $2.8 billion worth of American products—both sides agreed in principle to restart high-level consultations. But the spectre of an impending 50 percent tariff on European cars, floated repeatedly in Washington, has injected fresh urgency into negotiations. European officials fear that without a substantive quid pro quo, Trump’s administration could unilaterally impose punitive measures on exports worth tens of billions of euros. By arming themselves with detailed corporate investment profiles, Brussels hopes to present a “living ledger” of EU contributions to U.S. GDP, sidestepping ideological battles over trade doctrine in favor of highlighting mutual economic stakes.
In parallel, Brussels has fielded political delegations to major European companies with significant U.S. footprints—ranging from the CEOs of leading German automakers to executives at multinational pharmaceutical players headquartered in Basel. During these meetings, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen personally underscored the urgency of the request, stressing that swift cooperation would send a united message that Europe stands ready to defend jobs both sides of the Atlantic. Similarly, BusinessEurope’s president convened a special task force comprising the heads of large metal, chemical, and automotive firms to gather accurate figures on greenfield investments, joint ventures, and research grants disbursed in the United States. Even small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with specialized technology operations in U.S. innovation hubs have been asked to provide their projections for capital spending, signalling Brussels’ recognition that even seemingly modest contributions can sway public perceptions in regional American communities.
While most corporations have complied with the Commission’s request, some executives have raised concerns about sharing commercially sensitive information. For instance, automakers negotiating confidential supply contracts for electric vehicle batteries are wary of disclosing precise investment schedules that could alert competitors to their strategic intentions. To assuage such fears, Brussels has assured participants that data will be aggregated and anonymized before being presented to American counterparts, ensuring that no company-specific negotiations are revealed. Instead, a composite report will outline overall sectoral commitments—summing, for example, that European carmakers plan to invest a collective €20 billion in U.S. battery and electric vehicle infrastructure by 2028. Industry insiders note that this aggregated approach will help maintain competitive confidentiality while still providing negotiators with the ammunition they need to press the U.S. on the damage that higher tariffs would inflict on local economies.
Beyond safeguarding sensitive details, Brussels is also keenly aware that investment data alone will not automatically secure concessions from Washington. Trade experts emphasize that Europe must leverage such data in tandem with broader offerings—such as greater EU purchases of U.S. agricultural products, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and advanced technologies. Indeed, in prior discussions, the United States explicitly sought commitments from the EU to lift restrictions on genetically modified crops, expand market access for U.S. energy firms, and increase defence-related procurements. By laying out a transparent investment portfolio, the EU hopes to negotiate “package deals” in which Americans can tout headline figures—like “European investors boosting U.S. clean-energy projects by $30 billion”—while Europe secures the removal of long-standing barriers, such as retaliatory tariffs on bourbon whiskey and motorcycles.
The timing of Brussels’ initiative also responds to political currents on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States, Republican majorities in the House and Senate have vocally criticized the administration for undercutting American workers through poorly negotiated trade pacts. Congressional leaders have indicated that any deal which fails to secure deeper reciprocal market access or that appears to single out U.S. industries could languish in legislative gridlock. By demonstrating that European investments directly support American employment—especially in battleground states where manufacturing jobs are politically sensitive—Brussels hopes to sweeten the pill for lawmakers who might otherwise vote against a comprehensive trade agreement. In return, European lawmakers have grown impatient with the protracted nature of trade diplomacy; populist parties in several member states have portrayed the EU as hamstrung by U.S. intransigence rather than highlighting Europe’s willingness to compromise.
Economic data underscores why Brussels sees investments as such a potent bargaining chip. For example, in the auto sector, European brands account for approximately 20 percent of U.S. passenger vehicle sales. American auto-parts suppliers rely on European assembly plants in states like Michigan and Ohio for testing and trailer orders, generating thousands of ancillary jobs in distribution and maintenance. Separately, the pharmaceutical sector contributes to nearly 40 percent of U.S. drug manufacturing capacity, with European firms operating some of the country’s largest vaccination facilities. Even in digital services—where European cloud providers have historically held smaller market shares—Brussels points to regional successes: a German cloud-computing joint venture in Dallas that employs more than 2,000 workers, for instance, and a French high-performance computing research centre in California that partners with local universities to advance artificial intelligence research. When trade negotiators review these numbers, the EU hopes to frame tariff rollbacks not as unilateral giveaways but as investments in the shared prosperity of North America and Europe.
To ensure that the U.S. cannot easily minimize Europe’s roster of contributions, the Commission’s economic modeling team is preparing follow-up simulations that estimate potential job losses and output declines under various tariff scenarios. Early drafts circulated internally suggest that a 25 percent tariff on European cars could cost the U.S. economy more than 200,000 jobs in the automotive and related sectors within two years. Similarly, punitive duties on pharmaceuticals could delay generic drug production, raising healthcare costs by billions. European negotiators plan to share such projections with U.S. counterparts to make the case that, in a globalized supply chain, erecting trade barriers produces unintended self-inflicted wounds. By anchoring these projections to real-world examples—like the effect of a battery plant’s 500 new positions in a midwestern town—Brussels hopes to transform abstract numbers into concrete human narratives that resonate with American policymakers and journalists.
Despite these efforts, tensions persist about how transparent Brussels should be with U.S. trade officials. Some European Commission insiders caution that divulging too many details risks creating a target-rich environment for American negotiators seeking specific concessions from individual companies. There is a fine line, they say, between showcasing European economic ties and providing a roadmap that Washington could exploit to demand even deeper sacrifices. To mitigate this risk, the EU is exploring the idea of a “firewall”—a mechanism that would allow trade officials to reference investment figures in closed-door discussions without publishing them in official documents. Such an arrangement, if accepted by the U.S., would allow both parties to negotiate privately on sensitive matters while publicly framing the final deal as a mutual win.
Meanwhile, some European business leaders have privately expressed frustration that Brussels is placing a heavy burden on companies already struggling with post-pandemic recovery and a looming energy crisis. Firms cite rising costs from both labor shortages and volatile natural gas prices, which have eaten into profit margins over the past year. For these executives, responding to a detailed EU survey on U.S. spending represents a distraction from organizational priorities such as digital transformation and decarbonization. However, the message from Brussels has been unequivocal: firms that refuse to comply risk being sidelined in policy discussions, potentially forfeiting a seat at the table when final trade concessions are agreed. In practice, most of Europe’s top exporters have already acquiesced, providing the Commission with spreadsheets outlining projected capital outlays, phased hiring plans, and dates for facility inaugurations.
Beyond data gathering, Brussels is also refining its negotiating stance to reflect the findings. Trade Commissioner Šefčovič has prepared a series of “industry profiles” summarizing how each sector’s U.S. investments bolster American communities. These profiles will inform core EU objectives: halting any prospective U.S. auto tariffs, ensuring the restoration of zero duties on steel and aluminium, and establishing a framework for regulatory cooperation in emerging areas such as electric vehicle standards and green hydrogen production. Moreover, the EU hopes to secure a guarantee that U.S. anti-subsidy investigations into European firms—which have targeted concerns like electric vehicle battery grants—will be paused throughout the negotiating process. By aligning Brussels’ policy aims with the investment data, European leaders believe they can project a unified front that transcends short-term political shifts in both Washington and Brussels.
The request for corporate U.S. spending data also highlights a broader evolution in how the EU approaches trade diplomacy. Gone are the days when Brussels relied solely on tariff lines and sectoral quotas to frame negotiations. Increasingly, the Commission views trade as inextricably linked to foreign direct investment, technology transfer, and supply-chain resilience. This perspective reflects the reality that global value chains now span multiple continents, and that domestic economies cannot easily disentangle themselves without incurring significant cost. EU officials point to the COVID-19 pandemic as a wake-up call: disruptions in Asian supply routes underscored the need for diversified manufacturing bases, prompting many European companies to accelerate nearshoring efforts in North America. By highlighting these pandemic-driven shifts, Brussels hopes to convince U.S. policymakers that a mutually beneficial trade agreement can help both sides build more resilient supply networks rather than leaving them vulnerable to geopolitical swings.
Some observers caution, however, that this data-centric strategy may ultimately encounter limitations if underlying political divisions persist. Within the United States, a growing contingent of lawmakers views any deal that does not secure sweeping concessions on technology transfers or agricultural access as a capitulation to the EU. Meanwhile, in parts of Eastern and Central Europe, populist-leaning parties have criticized the Commission for appearing to prioritize transatlantic deals over strengthening intra-EU solidarity—arguing that an overly generous arrangement with the U.S. could undermine Europe’s cohesion. Balancing these competing pressures requires deft political maneuvering, and Brussels remains acutely aware that a perceived compromise of core European principles could inflame existing rifts within the 27-member bloc.
Notwithstanding these challenges, the prevailing consensus in Brussels is that the time for data-driven leverage has arrived. As trade ministers prepare to convene in Brussels for a dedicated EU-U.S. roundtable in early July, Commission President von der Leyen is expected to unveil a corporate investment “scorecard” illustrating the combined weight of Europe’s American business footprint. Simultaneously, U.S. Trade Representative negotiators will be scrutinizing the same information through the lens of domestic political pressures—particularly in industrial swing states where European plants and R\&D centers have become significant employers. Many EU officials believe that once these political constituencies are courted with evidence of mutual benefit, the path to a comprehensive trade deal—one that zeroes out tariffs on cars, steel, and high-value industrial goods—will become significantly clearer.
In the end, Brussels’ campaign to compile detailed U.S. spending data from its corporate champions speaks to a larger shift in transatlantic trade policy, where economic interdependence is wielded as a strategic instrument. Whether this approach can successfully steer Washington away from protectionist tactics remains to be seen. But for now, EU negotiators are betting that facts on the ground—measured in billions of euros invested, thousands of jobs created, and millions in local tax revenue—will prove more compelling than abstract appeals to free trade. In an era of heightened geopolitical tension and domestic populism on both sides of the Atlantic, leveraging the concrete economic footprint of European firms in America may be the single most persuasive case Brussels can make as it seeks to avert another damaging tariff standoff.
(Source:www.usnews.com)
In recent weeks, officials in Brussels have circulated surveys through the Confederation of European Business and the European Roundtable for Industry, two umbrella groups representing hundreds of companies from industries such as automotive, aerospace, pharmaceuticals, and digital services. The Commission’s outreach came with an urgent caveat: companies should treat the inquiry as high-priority and respond with comprehensive data on capital expenditures, job creation plans, and planned facility expansions in the U.S. over the next three to five years. While Brussels has periodically consulted industry stakeholders ahead of major trade initiatives, demanding granular U.S. investment figures represents a notable intensification of its data-driven strategy—one aimed at countering Washington’s “America First” narrative by highlighting the tangible benefits that European corporations already contribute to the American economy.
At the heart of Brussels’ approach lies a pragmatic calculation: if European negotiators can demonstrate that EU firms are pivotal to U.S. manufacturing, technology innovation, and job growth, President Trump and his advisors may be more inclined to temper threats of higher tariffs on sectors such as steel, automobiles, and chemicals. In multiple closed-door sessions, Commission trade specialists have emphasized that current talks will hinge less on abstract academic arguments about free trade theory and more on hard numbers that underscore reciprocal economic ties. For example, if Brussels can show that a major German automaker’s planned $3 billion battery plant in the Midwest supports thousands of workers, that fact becomes leverage when U.S. negotiators contemplate extending a 25 percent tariff on imported European cars. Conversely, highlighting that a Swiss pharmaceutical company’s multibillion-dollar R\&D campus in New Jersey catalyzes local supply chains could dissuade the White House from stoking further friction over intellectual property protection.
The request also reflects broader anxiety within EU capitals that Europe has more at stake in transatlantic commerce than the United States. According to data compiled last year, EU firms collectively invested over $150 billion in the American economy, spanning sectors from aerospace to agribusiness. In contrast, U.S. capital flows into Europe hovered around $100 billion—meaning that, on a net basis, European corporate spending has outpaced American outlays since 2023. Commissioners believe that emphasizing this asymmetry could mitigate Washington’s inclination to treat Europe as a hostile trading partner rather than a strategic ally. “We need to show that our investments sustain jobs, innovation clusters, and infrastructure in vital swing states,” commented a senior EU trade official. “The United States can ill afford a broad-based economic decoupling; our companies are already helping to power their growth.”
Brussels framed its inquiry to coincide with growing uncertainty in the run-up to formal trade dialogue sessions planned between EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič and his American counterparts. After months of back-and-forth over steel and aluminium duties—where permanent 25 percent U.S. tariffs have clashed with retaliatory EU levies on $2.8 billion worth of American products—both sides agreed in principle to restart high-level consultations. But the spectre of an impending 50 percent tariff on European cars, floated repeatedly in Washington, has injected fresh urgency into negotiations. European officials fear that without a substantive quid pro quo, Trump’s administration could unilaterally impose punitive measures on exports worth tens of billions of euros. By arming themselves with detailed corporate investment profiles, Brussels hopes to present a “living ledger” of EU contributions to U.S. GDP, sidestepping ideological battles over trade doctrine in favor of highlighting mutual economic stakes.
In parallel, Brussels has fielded political delegations to major European companies with significant U.S. footprints—ranging from the CEOs of leading German automakers to executives at multinational pharmaceutical players headquartered in Basel. During these meetings, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen personally underscored the urgency of the request, stressing that swift cooperation would send a united message that Europe stands ready to defend jobs both sides of the Atlantic. Similarly, BusinessEurope’s president convened a special task force comprising the heads of large metal, chemical, and automotive firms to gather accurate figures on greenfield investments, joint ventures, and research grants disbursed in the United States. Even small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with specialized technology operations in U.S. innovation hubs have been asked to provide their projections for capital spending, signalling Brussels’ recognition that even seemingly modest contributions can sway public perceptions in regional American communities.
While most corporations have complied with the Commission’s request, some executives have raised concerns about sharing commercially sensitive information. For instance, automakers negotiating confidential supply contracts for electric vehicle batteries are wary of disclosing precise investment schedules that could alert competitors to their strategic intentions. To assuage such fears, Brussels has assured participants that data will be aggregated and anonymized before being presented to American counterparts, ensuring that no company-specific negotiations are revealed. Instead, a composite report will outline overall sectoral commitments—summing, for example, that European carmakers plan to invest a collective €20 billion in U.S. battery and electric vehicle infrastructure by 2028. Industry insiders note that this aggregated approach will help maintain competitive confidentiality while still providing negotiators with the ammunition they need to press the U.S. on the damage that higher tariffs would inflict on local economies.
Beyond safeguarding sensitive details, Brussels is also keenly aware that investment data alone will not automatically secure concessions from Washington. Trade experts emphasize that Europe must leverage such data in tandem with broader offerings—such as greater EU purchases of U.S. agricultural products, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and advanced technologies. Indeed, in prior discussions, the United States explicitly sought commitments from the EU to lift restrictions on genetically modified crops, expand market access for U.S. energy firms, and increase defence-related procurements. By laying out a transparent investment portfolio, the EU hopes to negotiate “package deals” in which Americans can tout headline figures—like “European investors boosting U.S. clean-energy projects by $30 billion”—while Europe secures the removal of long-standing barriers, such as retaliatory tariffs on bourbon whiskey and motorcycles.
The timing of Brussels’ initiative also responds to political currents on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States, Republican majorities in the House and Senate have vocally criticized the administration for undercutting American workers through poorly negotiated trade pacts. Congressional leaders have indicated that any deal which fails to secure deeper reciprocal market access or that appears to single out U.S. industries could languish in legislative gridlock. By demonstrating that European investments directly support American employment—especially in battleground states where manufacturing jobs are politically sensitive—Brussels hopes to sweeten the pill for lawmakers who might otherwise vote against a comprehensive trade agreement. In return, European lawmakers have grown impatient with the protracted nature of trade diplomacy; populist parties in several member states have portrayed the EU as hamstrung by U.S. intransigence rather than highlighting Europe’s willingness to compromise.
Economic data underscores why Brussels sees investments as such a potent bargaining chip. For example, in the auto sector, European brands account for approximately 20 percent of U.S. passenger vehicle sales. American auto-parts suppliers rely on European assembly plants in states like Michigan and Ohio for testing and trailer orders, generating thousands of ancillary jobs in distribution and maintenance. Separately, the pharmaceutical sector contributes to nearly 40 percent of U.S. drug manufacturing capacity, with European firms operating some of the country’s largest vaccination facilities. Even in digital services—where European cloud providers have historically held smaller market shares—Brussels points to regional successes: a German cloud-computing joint venture in Dallas that employs more than 2,000 workers, for instance, and a French high-performance computing research centre in California that partners with local universities to advance artificial intelligence research. When trade negotiators review these numbers, the EU hopes to frame tariff rollbacks not as unilateral giveaways but as investments in the shared prosperity of North America and Europe.
To ensure that the U.S. cannot easily minimize Europe’s roster of contributions, the Commission’s economic modeling team is preparing follow-up simulations that estimate potential job losses and output declines under various tariff scenarios. Early drafts circulated internally suggest that a 25 percent tariff on European cars could cost the U.S. economy more than 200,000 jobs in the automotive and related sectors within two years. Similarly, punitive duties on pharmaceuticals could delay generic drug production, raising healthcare costs by billions. European negotiators plan to share such projections with U.S. counterparts to make the case that, in a globalized supply chain, erecting trade barriers produces unintended self-inflicted wounds. By anchoring these projections to real-world examples—like the effect of a battery plant’s 500 new positions in a midwestern town—Brussels hopes to transform abstract numbers into concrete human narratives that resonate with American policymakers and journalists.
Despite these efforts, tensions persist about how transparent Brussels should be with U.S. trade officials. Some European Commission insiders caution that divulging too many details risks creating a target-rich environment for American negotiators seeking specific concessions from individual companies. There is a fine line, they say, between showcasing European economic ties and providing a roadmap that Washington could exploit to demand even deeper sacrifices. To mitigate this risk, the EU is exploring the idea of a “firewall”—a mechanism that would allow trade officials to reference investment figures in closed-door discussions without publishing them in official documents. Such an arrangement, if accepted by the U.S., would allow both parties to negotiate privately on sensitive matters while publicly framing the final deal as a mutual win.
Meanwhile, some European business leaders have privately expressed frustration that Brussels is placing a heavy burden on companies already struggling with post-pandemic recovery and a looming energy crisis. Firms cite rising costs from both labor shortages and volatile natural gas prices, which have eaten into profit margins over the past year. For these executives, responding to a detailed EU survey on U.S. spending represents a distraction from organizational priorities such as digital transformation and decarbonization. However, the message from Brussels has been unequivocal: firms that refuse to comply risk being sidelined in policy discussions, potentially forfeiting a seat at the table when final trade concessions are agreed. In practice, most of Europe’s top exporters have already acquiesced, providing the Commission with spreadsheets outlining projected capital outlays, phased hiring plans, and dates for facility inaugurations.
Beyond data gathering, Brussels is also refining its negotiating stance to reflect the findings. Trade Commissioner Šefčovič has prepared a series of “industry profiles” summarizing how each sector’s U.S. investments bolster American communities. These profiles will inform core EU objectives: halting any prospective U.S. auto tariffs, ensuring the restoration of zero duties on steel and aluminium, and establishing a framework for regulatory cooperation in emerging areas such as electric vehicle standards and green hydrogen production. Moreover, the EU hopes to secure a guarantee that U.S. anti-subsidy investigations into European firms—which have targeted concerns like electric vehicle battery grants—will be paused throughout the negotiating process. By aligning Brussels’ policy aims with the investment data, European leaders believe they can project a unified front that transcends short-term political shifts in both Washington and Brussels.
The request for corporate U.S. spending data also highlights a broader evolution in how the EU approaches trade diplomacy. Gone are the days when Brussels relied solely on tariff lines and sectoral quotas to frame negotiations. Increasingly, the Commission views trade as inextricably linked to foreign direct investment, technology transfer, and supply-chain resilience. This perspective reflects the reality that global value chains now span multiple continents, and that domestic economies cannot easily disentangle themselves without incurring significant cost. EU officials point to the COVID-19 pandemic as a wake-up call: disruptions in Asian supply routes underscored the need for diversified manufacturing bases, prompting many European companies to accelerate nearshoring efforts in North America. By highlighting these pandemic-driven shifts, Brussels hopes to convince U.S. policymakers that a mutually beneficial trade agreement can help both sides build more resilient supply networks rather than leaving them vulnerable to geopolitical swings.
Some observers caution, however, that this data-centric strategy may ultimately encounter limitations if underlying political divisions persist. Within the United States, a growing contingent of lawmakers views any deal that does not secure sweeping concessions on technology transfers or agricultural access as a capitulation to the EU. Meanwhile, in parts of Eastern and Central Europe, populist-leaning parties have criticized the Commission for appearing to prioritize transatlantic deals over strengthening intra-EU solidarity—arguing that an overly generous arrangement with the U.S. could undermine Europe’s cohesion. Balancing these competing pressures requires deft political maneuvering, and Brussels remains acutely aware that a perceived compromise of core European principles could inflame existing rifts within the 27-member bloc.
Notwithstanding these challenges, the prevailing consensus in Brussels is that the time for data-driven leverage has arrived. As trade ministers prepare to convene in Brussels for a dedicated EU-U.S. roundtable in early July, Commission President von der Leyen is expected to unveil a corporate investment “scorecard” illustrating the combined weight of Europe’s American business footprint. Simultaneously, U.S. Trade Representative negotiators will be scrutinizing the same information through the lens of domestic political pressures—particularly in industrial swing states where European plants and R\&D centers have become significant employers. Many EU officials believe that once these political constituencies are courted with evidence of mutual benefit, the path to a comprehensive trade deal—one that zeroes out tariffs on cars, steel, and high-value industrial goods—will become significantly clearer.
In the end, Brussels’ campaign to compile detailed U.S. spending data from its corporate champions speaks to a larger shift in transatlantic trade policy, where economic interdependence is wielded as a strategic instrument. Whether this approach can successfully steer Washington away from protectionist tactics remains to be seen. But for now, EU negotiators are betting that facts on the ground—measured in billions of euros invested, thousands of jobs created, and millions in local tax revenue—will prove more compelling than abstract appeals to free trade. In an era of heightened geopolitical tension and domestic populism on both sides of the Atlantic, leveraging the concrete economic footprint of European firms in America may be the single most persuasive case Brussels can make as it seeks to avert another damaging tariff standoff.
(Source:www.usnews.com)
