Ukraine is preparing to lodge a landmark claim against Russia, demanding around US$44 billion in compensation for the climate-warming emissions produced by the war since Russia invaded in February 2022. At the heart of the case lies a novel hypothesis: that wartime emissions—stemming from fossil fuel combustion, cement and steel usage, forest fires and reconstruction—constitute a distinct category of damage for which one state can hold another accountable. The initiative underscores how the environmental externalities of modern warfare are increasingly entering the diplomatic, legal and financial arenas.
Why Ukraine is making the claim and how the figure was calculated
Ukraine’s drive to seek compensation is rooted in the mounting evidence of massive greenhouse-gas emissions tied to frontline hostilities, cratering infrastructure and widespread ecological destruction. Officials in Kyiv note that “huge amounts of additional CO2 and greenhouse gases” have been released, linked not only to the immediate combustion of military vehicles and munitions, but also to the aftermath: fires across forests and farmland, destruction of energy infrastructure, and the reconstruction and fortification wall-building that follows major damage.
To translate such emissions into financial terms, Ukraine has drawn on carbon-accounting work that estimates the “social cost of carbon” (the economic damage from each ton of CO2 equivalent) at roughly US$185 per ton. Using expert estimates that the conflict has generated about 237 million tons of additional CO2-equivalent emissions shares (noting other studies put the figure at 175 million tons for the first two years), the total damage calculation reaches roughly US$44 billion.
This sum encompasses emissions from military fuel burn, construction and reconstruction of front-line infrastructure, and the long-term land-use impacts of widespread fires and deforestation. By filing the claim via a compensation process under the umbrella of the Council of Europe, Ukraine intends to aggregate claims covering individual citizens, companies and the state itself.
How and why emissions rose sharply during the war
The dramatic rise in emissions arises from several distinct mechanisms. First, the sheer scale of military fuel consumption—armoured vehicles, transport convoys, aircraft and fortification work—has produced direct CO2 and other greenhouse-gas output. One analysis attributed over 50 million tons of CO2-equivalent in the first phase to military activity alone. Second, destruction of energy-system infrastructure—oil and gas plants, refineries, pipelines, power-stations—unleashed fugitive emissions, combustion and repair work. Third, landscape and forest fires linked to shelling, scorched-earth tactics and reduced firefighting capacity have released massive volumes of carbon stored in biomass.
One recent study placed Ukraine’s total war-linked emissions at about 230 million tons of CO2-equivalent by the third anniversary of full-scale conflict, equivalent to the annual emissions of countries such as Austria or Belgium combined. Fourth, post-destruction reconstruction adds further emissions: the manufacture and transport of cement, steel and other materials to rebuild towns, roads and utilities carry a heavy carbon footprint.
The convergence of high-intensity warfare, industrial-scale destruction and rapid subsequent rebuilding thus created a perfect storm. Ukraine’s claim asserts that these emissions are not merely incidental by-products of war, but represent measurable, compensable harm to climate, ecosystems and society.
Legal, diplomatic and financial obstacles in the compensation process
The notion of charging one state for wartime emissions is unprecedented, and brings with it complex hurdles. Ukraine proposes to submit its case through a dedicated claims commission set up under the Council of Europe to handle war-related damage claims—already registering tens of thousands of individual claimant files. The novelty of the claim, however, raises questions of jurisdiction, attribution and enforceability. Russia, not unexpectedly, has declined to comment publicly on the specific emissions demand. Establishing a causal link between emissions and climate harm, proving those emissions were the responsibility of Russia as aggressor, and quantifying the damage in a universally accepted legal framework are far from settled.
Another major question is: where will the compensation come from? Ukraine and its experts point to the possibility of tapping frozen Russian assets held in Western jurisdictions. With billions of dollars of Russian sovereign and corporate assets immobilised under sanctions, a pathway may exist—though diverting such funds to climate-emissions compensation rather than direct war-damage payouts would require political and legal consensus. Even defining the emission-damage figure as an “ecological liability” rather than traditional war-damage is untested. In addition, Russia’s absence from some international legal processes and refusal to submit to certain international mechanisms complicate the enforceability of any award.
The broader diplomatic context is also critical: Ukraine is aligning the claim with global climate-justice logic, arguing that war-amplified emissions not only harm Ukraine but contribute to global warming and thus longer-term risks for the international community. By framing the claim in climate-damage terms, Kyiv hopes to attract wider participation from states, foundations and humanitarian institutions.
Strategic and symbolic implications for Ukraine, climate policy and future conflicts
Ukraine’s move has ramifications well beyond the immediate numbers. Strategically, it shifts the narrative of war damage to include not only destroyed buildings, lost lives and displaced populations but also carbon and climate-harm metrics. For Kyiv, it elevates the stakes of reconstruction and leverage: success in the claim could provide fresh funding for rebuilding, while failure could reinforce Russia’s impunity in environmental terms.
On climate policy, the claim sets a precedent: if wartime emissions become compensable, states may face new liabilities for military operations and reconstruction emissions. The war in Ukraine has already exposed how conflict can undermine emissions-reduction targets and ecological restoration. Kyiv’s case may prompt international systems—as carbon-markets, treaties and war-repair registers—to incorporate “conflict emissions” as a category of harm.
In future conflicts, militaries and governments may need to account for their carbon footprints and potential liabilities. Ukraine’s filing may thus reshape the way armed conflict, climate risk and liability intersect. Moreover, for countries supporting Ukraine, it offers a dual wind-window: contributing to stability and emission-accounting frameworks that might deter future large-scale conflicts or at least incorporate environmental cost into war calculus.
For Russia, the claim is a reputational challenge. Beyond financial risk, exposure to litigation or arbitration over emissions may complicate its diplomatic rehabilitation, access to global financial markets and participation in climate governance frameworks. Though global attention remains fixed on conventional war-damage, the emissions dimension adds a quieter but persistent pressure.
Temporal, evidential and practical caveats to the claim’s success
While the logic is compelling, practical limitations remain. Quantification of emissions during an active war is inherently uncertain: displacement-related fuel use, clandestine flows, and forest-fire dynamics reduce precision. Attribution to Russian versus Ukrainian forces, and distinguishing between emissions that would have occurred absent war, elevate complexity. The social cost of carbon metric used—US$185/ton—is based on scientific modelling and remains contested in legal fora.
Furthermore, the timeline for compensation is likely to stretch into years. Many heavy-carbon emissions from the war accumulate over time, including through reconstruction, land-use change and long-standing forest damage whose full impact may only play out over decades. Legal precedents for war-related environmental compensation are scant; while environmental damage claims exist, tying emissions to aggression and climate liability is novel.
Finally, the quantum—US$44 billion—is significant, but pales beside overall war-damage claims and reconstruction costs, which for Ukraine run into hundreds of billions. Hence the claim may function more as a statement of principle than an immediate funding source. Nonetheless, it expands the map of war liability, placing emissions and climate impact at the centre of reparations thinking.
Through this bold initiative, Ukraine has raised the cat-out-of-the-bag: the environmental accounting of war will no longer be sidelined. The challenge now lies in the institutional follow-through, the legal frameworks, and whether states are willing to recognise the climate cost of armed conflict—and to pay for it.
(Source:www.theprint.com)
Why Ukraine is making the claim and how the figure was calculated
Ukraine’s drive to seek compensation is rooted in the mounting evidence of massive greenhouse-gas emissions tied to frontline hostilities, cratering infrastructure and widespread ecological destruction. Officials in Kyiv note that “huge amounts of additional CO2 and greenhouse gases” have been released, linked not only to the immediate combustion of military vehicles and munitions, but also to the aftermath: fires across forests and farmland, destruction of energy infrastructure, and the reconstruction and fortification wall-building that follows major damage.
To translate such emissions into financial terms, Ukraine has drawn on carbon-accounting work that estimates the “social cost of carbon” (the economic damage from each ton of CO2 equivalent) at roughly US$185 per ton. Using expert estimates that the conflict has generated about 237 million tons of additional CO2-equivalent emissions shares (noting other studies put the figure at 175 million tons for the first two years), the total damage calculation reaches roughly US$44 billion.
This sum encompasses emissions from military fuel burn, construction and reconstruction of front-line infrastructure, and the long-term land-use impacts of widespread fires and deforestation. By filing the claim via a compensation process under the umbrella of the Council of Europe, Ukraine intends to aggregate claims covering individual citizens, companies and the state itself.
How and why emissions rose sharply during the war
The dramatic rise in emissions arises from several distinct mechanisms. First, the sheer scale of military fuel consumption—armoured vehicles, transport convoys, aircraft and fortification work—has produced direct CO2 and other greenhouse-gas output. One analysis attributed over 50 million tons of CO2-equivalent in the first phase to military activity alone. Second, destruction of energy-system infrastructure—oil and gas plants, refineries, pipelines, power-stations—unleashed fugitive emissions, combustion and repair work. Third, landscape and forest fires linked to shelling, scorched-earth tactics and reduced firefighting capacity have released massive volumes of carbon stored in biomass.
One recent study placed Ukraine’s total war-linked emissions at about 230 million tons of CO2-equivalent by the third anniversary of full-scale conflict, equivalent to the annual emissions of countries such as Austria or Belgium combined. Fourth, post-destruction reconstruction adds further emissions: the manufacture and transport of cement, steel and other materials to rebuild towns, roads and utilities carry a heavy carbon footprint.
The convergence of high-intensity warfare, industrial-scale destruction and rapid subsequent rebuilding thus created a perfect storm. Ukraine’s claim asserts that these emissions are not merely incidental by-products of war, but represent measurable, compensable harm to climate, ecosystems and society.
Legal, diplomatic and financial obstacles in the compensation process
The notion of charging one state for wartime emissions is unprecedented, and brings with it complex hurdles. Ukraine proposes to submit its case through a dedicated claims commission set up under the Council of Europe to handle war-related damage claims—already registering tens of thousands of individual claimant files. The novelty of the claim, however, raises questions of jurisdiction, attribution and enforceability. Russia, not unexpectedly, has declined to comment publicly on the specific emissions demand. Establishing a causal link between emissions and climate harm, proving those emissions were the responsibility of Russia as aggressor, and quantifying the damage in a universally accepted legal framework are far from settled.
Another major question is: where will the compensation come from? Ukraine and its experts point to the possibility of tapping frozen Russian assets held in Western jurisdictions. With billions of dollars of Russian sovereign and corporate assets immobilised under sanctions, a pathway may exist—though diverting such funds to climate-emissions compensation rather than direct war-damage payouts would require political and legal consensus. Even defining the emission-damage figure as an “ecological liability” rather than traditional war-damage is untested. In addition, Russia’s absence from some international legal processes and refusal to submit to certain international mechanisms complicate the enforceability of any award.
The broader diplomatic context is also critical: Ukraine is aligning the claim with global climate-justice logic, arguing that war-amplified emissions not only harm Ukraine but contribute to global warming and thus longer-term risks for the international community. By framing the claim in climate-damage terms, Kyiv hopes to attract wider participation from states, foundations and humanitarian institutions.
Strategic and symbolic implications for Ukraine, climate policy and future conflicts
Ukraine’s move has ramifications well beyond the immediate numbers. Strategically, it shifts the narrative of war damage to include not only destroyed buildings, lost lives and displaced populations but also carbon and climate-harm metrics. For Kyiv, it elevates the stakes of reconstruction and leverage: success in the claim could provide fresh funding for rebuilding, while failure could reinforce Russia’s impunity in environmental terms.
On climate policy, the claim sets a precedent: if wartime emissions become compensable, states may face new liabilities for military operations and reconstruction emissions. The war in Ukraine has already exposed how conflict can undermine emissions-reduction targets and ecological restoration. Kyiv’s case may prompt international systems—as carbon-markets, treaties and war-repair registers—to incorporate “conflict emissions” as a category of harm.
In future conflicts, militaries and governments may need to account for their carbon footprints and potential liabilities. Ukraine’s filing may thus reshape the way armed conflict, climate risk and liability intersect. Moreover, for countries supporting Ukraine, it offers a dual wind-window: contributing to stability and emission-accounting frameworks that might deter future large-scale conflicts or at least incorporate environmental cost into war calculus.
For Russia, the claim is a reputational challenge. Beyond financial risk, exposure to litigation or arbitration over emissions may complicate its diplomatic rehabilitation, access to global financial markets and participation in climate governance frameworks. Though global attention remains fixed on conventional war-damage, the emissions dimension adds a quieter but persistent pressure.
Temporal, evidential and practical caveats to the claim’s success
While the logic is compelling, practical limitations remain. Quantification of emissions during an active war is inherently uncertain: displacement-related fuel use, clandestine flows, and forest-fire dynamics reduce precision. Attribution to Russian versus Ukrainian forces, and distinguishing between emissions that would have occurred absent war, elevate complexity. The social cost of carbon metric used—US$185/ton—is based on scientific modelling and remains contested in legal fora.
Furthermore, the timeline for compensation is likely to stretch into years. Many heavy-carbon emissions from the war accumulate over time, including through reconstruction, land-use change and long-standing forest damage whose full impact may only play out over decades. Legal precedents for war-related environmental compensation are scant; while environmental damage claims exist, tying emissions to aggression and climate liability is novel.
Finally, the quantum—US$44 billion—is significant, but pales beside overall war-damage claims and reconstruction costs, which for Ukraine run into hundreds of billions. Hence the claim may function more as a statement of principle than an immediate funding source. Nonetheless, it expands the map of war liability, placing emissions and climate impact at the centre of reparations thinking.
Through this bold initiative, Ukraine has raised the cat-out-of-the-bag: the environmental accounting of war will no longer be sidelined. The challenge now lies in the institutional follow-through, the legal frameworks, and whether states are willing to recognise the climate cost of armed conflict—and to pay for it.
(Source:www.theprint.com)
